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tis now an acknowledged fact that although Nigeria is one of the most 
resource-endowed nations in the world it has however failed to actualise 
its huge resources in the form of development. Indeed, Nigeria is today 
not only among the poorest in the world (with the world's third largest 
population of the poor), but it also has some of the worst health and 
social indicators in the world. Life expectancy in Nigeria is one of the lowest in 
the world and it is further declining; moreover infant and maternal health 
indicators show that the nation has some of the world's highest U5MR and 
maternal mortality. The country now has the third largest population of HIV/ 
AIDS infections in the world and accounts for 10 percent of all new infections 
in the world. In addition, although Nigeria acquired independence in 1960 as a 
democratic state, its post-independence political history has been dominated 
by military and other forms of dictatorship. Between 1960 and 2006, the country 
was under military dictatorship for 28 years while another form of dictatorship 
occurred for another 7 years ( 1999- 2006). 
Although several factors have been held to account for the nation's dismal 
performance the role of the failure of the institutional frameworks for managing 
development and democracy in Nigeria has only received scant attention. And 
yet, as Adedotun Sulaiman (NESG, 2005:1 08), Chairman of Accenture noted 
at the 11th Nigerian Economic Summit, "Institutions are the key determinants 
of a nation's successes or failures. 'The role of institutions' is fundamental to 
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any legitimate claim (by any group 
or nation) to civilization". If institutions 
indeed determine the success or 
failure of a nation, it can be argued 
not only that the acute problems of 
development and democracy in 
Nigeria need to be attributed to the 
failure of institutions and, even more 
importantly, that attempts to further 
development must be premised upon 
an initial understanding of the set of 
factors that have contributed to the 
failure of the institutional frameworks, 
for managing development in Nigeria. 
This paper focuses upon an 
examination of the set offactors that 
are responsible for the failure of the 
institutional frameworks for managing 
resources and hence development 
and democracy in Nigeria. It locates 
these factors in the weaknesses in 
the ideological framework within 
which institutional choices are made, 
faulty institutional design, the values 
used in designing institutions, the 
practical methods by which 
institutional arrangements are given 
effect, the contradictions between the 
economic and the political instances 
and corruption. On the basis of the 
analysis of these factors, the paper 
indicates what needs to be done to 
ensure that institutions function in 
ways that attain the development and 
democratic objectives of the country. 
However, in order to properly situate 
the discussion, the paper begins with 
a brief analysis of the essence of 
institutions. 
The Essence of Institutions 
To understand the essence of 
institutions it is necessary to examine 
the process through which they arise 
or are created. This process is 
institutionalisation. 
Institutionalisation describes the 
process by which individuals typify 
and share the meanings embedded 
in habitualised actions. While 
habitualisation can occur as an 
individual project, it is in the 
typification of such habitualised 
actions across a number of 
individuals that constitutes the 
essence of institutions. 
Habitualisation is the process by 
which an individual establishes a 
pattern in and for an activity. The 
foundation for habitualisation is 
repetitive activity; by doing the same 
thing over and over the individual 
establishes a procedure or set of 
routines, which he/she then 
experiences as 'the pattern' for 
performing the given activity or living 
in the world. Typification occurs when 
several others experience and share 
'the pattern' as 'the pattern'. It is 
precisely at the moment of reciprocal 
typification that institutions arise. As 
Berger and Luckman (1976:72) have 
noted in this regard: 
"Institutions imply historicity and 
control. Reciprocal typifications 
of actions are built up in the 
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course of a shared history. They 
cannot be created 
instantaneously. Institutions 
always have a history, of which 
they are the products. It is 
impossible to understand an 
institution adequately without an 
understanding of the historical 
process in which it was 
produced. Institutions, also by 
the vety fact of their existence, 
control human conduct by 
setting up predefined patterns 
of conduct, which channel it in 
one direction as against the 
many other directions that would 
theoretically be possible. It is 
important to stress that this 
controlling character is inherent 
in institutionalisation as such, 
prior to or apart from any 
mechanisms of sanctions set 
up to support an institution." 
These observations indicate the 
power of institutions; they provide the 
software that programs the behaviour 
and hence performance of actors in 
the setting. Problems in the software 
will often have far reaching 
consequences for behaviour and 
action. However, this also means that 
institutions function at two 
interdependent levels; first at the level 
ofthe software of values or meanings 
that must be shared for typified, 
reciprocal behaviour to occur and 
second, at the level of the agencies 
that will need to be designed to give 
effect to, or run, the software. While 
this paper is more concerned with the 
agencies that are designed to 
promote development and democracy 
in Nigeria, it must be understood as 
shall be discussed later that problems 
at the level of software have had 
implications for the effectiveness of 
the agencies themselves. 
Nigeria's Institutional 
Landscape 
Today, Nigeria has many institutions 
that are designed to promote 
development and democracy in 
Nigeria. In the area of resources 
management and hence 
development, these include NEEDS, 
EFCC, ICPC, Ministries, 
Commissions, the judiciary, Due 
Process Office, the Executive, the 
different levels of government, 
SERVICOM, Small Scale and 
Medium Enterprises Dev. Agency of 
Nigeria and several others. In the 
political realm, many of these 
institutions are also implicated but 
institutions, such as the Executive, 
National and State Assemblies, the 
Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC), the Judiciary 
and the coercive arms of the state -
the army, police, and security 
agencies, have special responsibility. 
NEEDS, for example, provides the 
macro-institutional framework for 
resources management in Nigeria 
while INEC has specific responsibility 
for managing the system of political 
succession in Nigeria. Given the 
plethora of institutions that exist in 
Nigeria, the important question is how 
the entire institutional framework, 
rather than individual institutions, has 
performed against the huge 
opportunities for democracy and 
development in Nigeria. 
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Institutional Performance in 
Nigeria 
Institutions are a means to an end; 
they are not ends in themselves. To 
measure the effectiveness of 
institutions, we must examine the 
degree to which the ends they are 
set up to serve have been or are being 
attained. At the national level, the 
most important ends or outcomes 
have to do with human development; 
the degree to which existing 
institutions lead to a state of well-
being for the citizens of the country. 
Indeed, there is now wide agreement 
that development is no longer simply 
about 'economic', 'political' or 
'technological' advancement, but 
about people. Development may be 
about the structural transformation of 
the economy or about capital 
accumulation but the end result is to 
permit the 'self-generating and self-
perpetuating use and development of 
the people's potential (Cockcroft, 
Frank and Johnson, (1972:xvi), or to 
'enable the national economy and the 
people reproduce themselves 
(Omoweh, 2000:35). In effect, 
"development implies an increasing 
capacity (of a social group)to regulate 
both internal and external 
relationships ... " (Walter Rodney's 
1972:10,11). The idea that 
development is about people 
indicates clearly that resources 
management is about human 
development. As the UNDP (2000: 19) 
emphasises in its Human 
Development Report for 2000, 'the 
idea of human development focuses 
directly on the progress of human 
lives and well-being. Since well-being 
includes living with substantial 
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Development may be 
about the structural 
transformation of the 
economy or about 
capital accumulation 
but the end result is to 
permit the 'self-
generating and self-
perpetuating use and 
development of the 
people's potential 
freedoms, human development is 
also centrally connected with 
enhancing certain capabilities - the 
range of things a person can do and 
be in leading a life'. 
Two broad institutional periods 
may be discerned in Nigeria's 
resources management history: the 
period of state-led development ( 1960 
-1985); and the period of state-retreat 
from leading the development 
process (1985- till date). The first 
period is characterised by state 
planning of the national economy. 
During this period, the state provided 
not only the macro-framework for 
resources planning and management 
but provided and monitored various 
performance targets in different 
sectors of the economy. The state 
supported this role by being a major 
owner of productive assets through 
the establishment of state-owned 
enterprises. 
The second period is 
characterised, first, by the adoption 
of some forms of state regulation of 
the economy within the context of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes 
and, later, by the adoption of a full 
blown nee-liberal ideology of 
development under the framework of 
the National Economic 
Empowerment Development Strategy 
(NEEDS). Under NEEDS, the state 
abdicates its leadership role in 
resources management and 
allocation decisions to the private 
sector and restricts itself to 
conducing policy reforms that will 
ensure a private sector-led 
development. Indeed, Nigeria's 
institutional history shows that: (i) 
over the period, Nigeria has moved 
from a more institutional environment 
to a more anti-institutional market 
forces led development process; (ii) 
the movement from a more 
institutional environment to a market-
forces-led development process has 
been accompanied by an increasing 
role of external forces and interests 
- TNCs, the World Bank, IMF, WTO, 
etc- in the management of national 
resources; and (iii) the performance 
of the economy has worsened as 
Nigeria has moved from a more 
institutional environment to a more 
anti-institutional market-forces-led 
development process. 
For example, a comparison of 
the performance of the national 
economy in the two institutional 
periods shows that Nigeria achieved 
much higher development and growth 
rates in the first period. In the case 
of human resources development and 
utilisation, we have noted elsewhere 
(lyayi and Agbaragu, 2005) that: 'One 
major fact emerges in the comparison 
of efforts at human resources 
development between the two periods 
-This is that the first period witnessed 
a much more serious attempt to 
develop the human resources of the 
country. Allocations to education as 
a percentage of the national budget 
were not only higher in the first period; 
attempts were made to situate 
investments in human resource (HR) 
development within a framework of 
national development that identified 
HR as the strategic resource in 
development. No evidence makes 
this point clearer than the fact that 
the allocations to education from 1958 
to 1960 as a percentage of the 
national budget were higher than the 
allocation to education in 2003 and 
2004. Thus the first budget of the 
Balewa government allocated 6.15 
per cent of the Federal budget to 
education, a figure much higher than 
the 2003 and 2004 budgetary 
provisions.' 
Indeed, our recent institutional 
history shows that our performance 
has not only been dismal; it has 
deteriorated in all areas of human 
development in recent years. Thus the 
2005 Human Development Report 
ranks Nigeria 158 out of 177 countries 
in the world in terms of overall human 
development. Ghana is ranked 138 
while South Africa is ranked 120 on 
the HOI. Compared with South Africa 
and Ghana, the indices for life 
expectancy, infant mortality and 
maternal mortality rates are much 
higher in Nigeria than in these other 
countries (UNDP: Human 
Development Report, 2005). For the 
2000-2005 period, life expectancy at 
birth was estimated at 43.3 years for 
Nigeria compared to 56.7 years for 
Ghana and 49 years for South Africa. 
For the 2000 -2005 period, the 
probability at birth of surviving to age 
55 for females in Ghana (52.9 per 
cent) was almost twice that of Nigeria 
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(33.2 per cent). A World Health 
Organisation evaluation of the health 
situation in different parts of the world 
also placed Nigeria 187 out of 191 
countries that were surveyed in 2000 
(Federal Ministry of Health, Health 
Sector Reform Program: 2004 -2007). 
Furthermore, infant and maternal 
health indicators in Nigeria are among 
the worst in the world. Thus the 
children under age five who are under-
weight and under-height were 
respectively 29 per cent and 38 per 
cent in 2003 in Nigeria and much 
higher than the comparative figures 
for Ghana (25 per cent and 26 per 
cent) and South Africa ( 12 per cent 
and 25 per cent). For the 1998-2003 
period in Nigeria, infants with low birth 
weight stood at 14 per cent of live 
births while one year olds fully 
immunised against tuberculosis and 
measles were, respectively, 48 per 
cent and 35 per cent. The 
comparative figures for Ghana were 
92 per cent (tuberculosis) and 80 per 
cent (measles), while those for South 
Africa were 97 per cent (tuberculosis) 
and 83 per cent (measles). In the year 
2000, the maternal mortality ratio 
(adjusted) per 100,000 live births in 
Nigeria was 800. The corresponding 
figures for Ghana and South Africa 
were 540 and 240. By 2003, the 
maternal mortality ratio in Nigeria had 
risen to 948/100,000. Indeed (with a 
range of 339/100,000 to 1.716/ 
1 00,000) Nigeria's maternal mortality 
rate is considered to be 'one of the 
highest in the world' (FMOH Health 
Sector Reform Program, p.2). 
The evidence also shows that 
Nigeria fares very badly in the areas 
of health expenditure, number of 
births attended by health personnel, 
and number of physicians per 100,000 
of the population. Compared to 
Ghana and South Africa, The per 
capita expenditure on health in 2002 
was US$43 in Nigeria, US$73 in 
Ghana and US$689 in South Africa. 
At the same time, for the 1990-2004 
period, the number of births attended 
by skilled health personnel was 41 
per cent for sub-Saharan Africa, 35 
per cent for Nigeria, 44 per cent for 
Ghana and 84 per cent for South 
Africa. The number of physicians per 
1 00,000 of the population was 27 for 
Nigeria, and 69 for South Africa. 
The incidence, depth and 
severity of poverty have also been 
growing in Nigeria over the years. 
Income inequality is very high in 
Nigeria (UNDP Human Development 
Report (2000: 171 ). A small proportion 
of the population (20 per cent) 
receives 55.7 per cent of the national 
income while the poorest 20 per cent 
consumes only 4.4 per cent of the 
national income. The outstanding 
proportion of the population (60 per 
cent) has access to 39.9 per cent of 
the national income (National Policy 
on Poverty Eradication, UNDP 
Human Development Reports, 2000; 
2005). The employment situation in 
Nigeria has become precarious in 
recent years. Beginning with the 
introduction of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme in the mid 
1980s by the Babangida military 
regime, unemployment and job 
insecurity have been on the rise in 
Nigeria. Massive job losses occurred 
in the 1985-1993 period and the 1999-
2006 period witnessed huge job 
losses in the public sector as a result 
of the public sector reforms. Indeed, 
a recent survey conducted by the 
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Federal Bureau of Statistics shows 
that 43.1 per cent of employees in 
the public service have already lost 
their jobs as a result of the 
privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises. 
Energy supply and 
infrastructures such as the state of 
transportation and transportation 
systems have virtually collapsed in 
Nigeria. According to the WHO, one 
in ten hospitalisations in Sub-Sahara 
Africa is accident and injury-related; 
the rate of accidents and injury-related 
disabilities 'using the disability 
adjusted life expectancy (DALE) is 
highest in sub-Saharan Africa' among 
all the regions in the world (Aiiyu, 
2002:2). Nigeria contributes the most 
significant number of the figures for 
sub-Saharan Africa and has one of 
the highest road traffic accidents 
rates in the world (Asogwa, 1999).1n 
a review of trends of road accidents 
in Nigeria, Oluwasanmi (1993) 
reports that the incidence of road 
accidents has been increasing over 
the period. Whereas an estimated 
18,000 people died in road accidents 
and accidents-related injuries 
between 1960 and 1969, the 
corresponding figure for 1980- 1989 
was 92,000. These figures are bound 
to be much higher for the 1990-2006 
periods when we add the 
contributions of mortality and 
morbidity from the series of air 
disasters. 
Environmental problems have 
also worsened in Nigeria in recent 
years. Industrial pollution, 
desertification, flooding and erosion 
and environmental pollution arising 
from oil and gas exploitation have 
been on the increase. In the case of 
Although the overall 
trajectory of Nigeria's 
political history has 
been characterised by 
violence, this 
characteristic has 
deepened in recent 






parties, groups and 
individuals, and state 
authoritarianism. 
desertification, the Federal 
Government has now admitted that, 
"the extent and severity of 
desertification in Nigeria have not 
been fully established, nor has the 
rate of progression been fully 
established." However, nine states in 
Nigeria with a total land area of 
393,168 square kilometers of land 
that account for 43 per cent of 
Nigeria's total land area are severely 
affected by desertification. It is 
estimated that between 50 per cent 
and 75 per cent of Bauchi, Barno, 
Gombe, Jigawa, Kana, Katsina, 
Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, Adamawa and 
Zamfara states are affected by 
desertification. The same situation 
applies to erosion and flooding. 
Although it has been acknowledged 
that 'the erosion (in these parts) has 
reached crisis proportions' in the 
South East of the country, the 
government has also admitted that 
'interventions in soil erosion and flood 
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control have been ad-hoc and 
haphazard coupled with inadequate 
funding'. 
In the case of the Niger Delta, 
there is general agreement that the 
area has now become an ecological 
wasteland. Several major rivers are 
heavily polluted; farmlands are under 
acid rain and oil spills, and carbon 
dioxide emissions in the area are 
among the highest in the world. Gas 
flaring has raised temperatures and 
rendered large areas inhospitable, oil 
canals and pipelines crisscross the 
land making it impossible and dan-
gerous to undertake economic activi-
ties on it. For example, it has been 
calculated that some 45.8 billion kilo-
watts of heat are discharged into the 
atmosphere of the Niger Delta from 
flaring 1.8 billion cubic feet of gas 
every day (Agbola and Olurin, 2003). 
It is conservatively estimated that 
between 1976 and 1996 a total of 
2,369,470.40 barrels of crude oil was 
spilled into the rivers and lands of the 
Niger Delta. Indeed, following the 
problems in the Niger Delta, Nigeria 
has been adjudged to have "one of 
the worst environmental records in the 
world" (http:// 
rainforests. mo n g a bay. com/ 
20nigeria.htm: 8-16-2006). 
In the political realm, it is also 
generally acknowledged that the 
institutional framework has failed to 
promote democracy and good 
governance in Nigeria. Although the 
overall trajectory of Nigeria's political 
history has been characterised by 
violence, this characteristic has 
deepened in recent years with the 
ascendancy of politically motivated 
assassinations, state supported 
violence against opposition parties, 
groups and individuals, and state 
authoritarianism. Elections have 
increasingly become a farce as the 
sovereignty of the people has been 
replaced by the fiat of political 
godfathers in and out of government. 
Thus in the general elections of 2003 
and 2007, the ruling political elite in 
government executed a coup that 
involved the most massive electoral 
frauds and violence ever witnessed 
in Nigeria's political history. The 
massive electoral frauds and violence 
involved all major institutions charged 
with the administration of the electoral 
process in the country. 
This review of institutional 
performance in Nigeria shows clearly 
that the recent institutional 
arrangements have failed to promote 
human development and democracy 
in Nigeria. Although Nigeria has many 
institutions that are designed to 
promote development and democracy 
in Nigeria, Nigerians today are 
among the poorest, the most 
diseased and the most poorly 
governed in the world. This situation 
has also led to a state of generalised 
anomie, to a sense of the 'ends justify 
the means' and desperation among 
the Nigerian people. Indeed, life has 
truly become nasty, brutish and short 
in Nigeria. 
Explanatory Factors for 
Institutional Failure in 
Nigeria 
A number of factors can be held to 
account for the failure of the 
'institutional frameworks' that have 
been adopted for managing 
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Although Nigeria has 
many institutions that 
are designed to 
promote development 
and democracy in 
Nigeria, Nigerians 
today are among the 
poorest, the most 
diseased and the most 
poorly governed in 
the world. 
development and democracy in 
Nigeria in the recent period. These 
include weaknesses in the 
ideological framework within which 
institutional choices are made, faulty 
institutional design, external origins 
of the governing variables and values 
used in designing the institutions, the 
practical methods by which 
institutional arrangements are given 
effect, the contradictions between the 
economic and the political instances 
and corruption. 
The Ideological Framework 
as Context for Institutional 
Choices 
Institutional frameworks are not 
chosen in a vacuum; rather such 
choices are determined by the larger 
ideological framework that governs 
relations between different classes in 
society. Nigeria was designed to be 
a capitalist society. However, not all 
forms of capitalism are favourable to 
the operation of institutions. As we 
have seen, between 1960 and 1985, 
Nigeria adopted national planning as 
a basis for managing national 
resources and development. After 
1985, with the advent of SAP, the 
Nigerian state retreated from macro-
economic planning in favour of the 
dictates of a resurging nee-liberal, free 
market ideology. From 1999 onwards, 
the Nigerian state adopted a full-
blown nee-liberal market ideology as 
the basis for national development. 
Nee-liberalism and its 
unregulated market forces undermine 
the effectiveness of institutions in a 
number of ways; first, by placing a 
lot of economic power in the hands 
of the already few powerful forces in 
society (economic power is 
subsequently realised as political 
power and used in defining the 
boundaries of institutions); second by 
circumscribing the scope of 
institutional operations (for example, 
through such strategies as 
privatisation and the idea of a private 
sector led development process, the 
institution of the state is defined in 
ways that limit its ability to intervene 
more effectively in the economy); 
thirdly by disempowering the popular 
masses (through poverty) whose 
needs, interests and energies should 
drive development. In essence a nee-
liberal philosophy of resources 
management is a self-help philosophy 
of development that places the 
burden of development on the most 
vulnerable and marginalised 
segments of the society. 
In the Nigerian context in 
particular and in other Third World 
contexts in general, experience has 
also shown that a nee-liberal strategy 
of development has several other 
major problems. One of these is that 
NESG Economic Indicators January - March 2007 • 43 
r------------ -- -- -
it is disconnected from a historical 
understanding of the most important 
challenges in the local setting. A 
second problem is that it does not 
take into account the unwillingness 
of local ruling elites to forgo privileges 
that undermine the very freedoms that 
it is designed to promote (for 
example, while the state pursues 
privatisation of state enterprises, it 
holds on to a centralised land use 
legislation that denies land and 
property rights to citizens). 
Faulty Institutional Design 
It is very often the case that 
institutional frameworks are designed 
to be faulty from the start. As an 
example, consider the framework of 
rules and regulations enacted by the 
Nigerian state for the exploitation of 
the oil and gas resources in the Niger 
Delta by western transnational oil 
companies. This framework is known 
to be weak and open to flagrant 
abuse not only by the people in the 
Niger Delta, the Nigerian state, 
international observers but also the 
oil companies themselves. It has thus 
been argued that the express intent 
of the regulatory framework is to give 
the state and the oil companies 
unfettered control not only over the 
oil and gas resources but to ensure 
maximum extraction of surplus value 
at the least cost and without regards 
for the environmental and natural 
rights of the peoples of the Niger 
Delta. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the general purpose of the 
framework of rules and regulations for 
oil and gas exploitation in the Niger 
Delta is to enable the Nigerian state 
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It has thus been 
argued that the 
express intent of the 
regulatory framework 
is to give the state and 
the oil companies 
unfettered control not 
only over the oil and 
gas resources hut to 
ensure maximum 
extraction of surplus 
value at the least cost 
and without regards 
for the environmental 
and natural rights of 
the peoples of the 
Niger Delta. 
and the oil companies to engage in 
forms of accounting that, while 
increasing corporate profits and 
individual fortunes, produce huge 
financial losses for the country and 
impoverish the mass of the people in 
the Niger Delta, in particular (Sagay, 
2001 :25; lyayi, 2006; Ake, 2001 ). The 
former Managing Director of the IMF 
eloquently makes this point when he 
observes that, 'Such companies as 
ExxonMobil or Shell would find it 
uncomfortable to reveal how much 
profit is earned from developing 
countries, how much money 
accumulated in tax havens, how little 
money goes back to the country 
where the company is incorporated. 
When a major company does a 
business with a turnover of say $1 00 
billion and has to show where these 
profits were earned, and how little tax 
was paid in those countries, I think it 
would be highly embarrassing. Even 
if the transactions have the aura of 
legality and are booked through tax 
havens, it would still be 
embarrassing'. 
External Origins of the 
Governing Variables and 
Values 
One major problem with the 
institutional frameworks adopted for 
managing national development in 
Nigeria has been that they have been 
externally driven. A classic case in 
this regard is the NEITI on which 
Nigeria has put much store in terms 
of being an internal initiative. To 
illustrate the point at stake, it is 
necessary to go to the framework of 
the international interests of capital 
within which energy questions are 
encountered and answered. This 
framework reveals that while the 
Nigerian government would like to 
pride itself as being the first Third 
World government to sign up for the 
Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), the US government 
had already decided in line with its 
energy interests that Nigeria must 
become involved in that initiative. 
Testifying before the US Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Sub-
Committee on International 
Economic Policy, Export and Trade 
Promotion on July, 15, 2004, Paul 
Simmons, the US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Energy revealed that 
Nigeria was one of the first four pilot 
Third World countries selected by the 
G8 countries to sign up for the 
initiative. The other countries were 
--~ -~~ --------------------------------------
Peru, Nicaragua and Georgia. 
According to Paul Simmons, the 
inclusion of Nigeria among the first 
four pilot countries was occasioned 
by the fact that: 
"US energy policy seeks to 
encourage in countries around 
the world like-minded free 
market policies toward energy 
and investment, emphasising 
the expansion and diversification 
of energy supplies. A key 
component of our effort to 
diversify energy supplies is to 
support greater stability and 
security among existing 
supplies. West African energy 
suppliers have traditionally been 
quite reliable resources for the 
world market. Recent trends, 
however, have threatened the 
international reputation of some 
West African countries as 
reliable suppliers. When one-
third of Nigeria's oil production 
was shut in during March and 
April because of violence in the 
Niger Delta, oil markets were 
faced with an additional, 
unanticipated supply disruption 
in the wake of Venezuela oil 
strike and activities in Iraq. In 
response to these concerns, we 
have increased ongoing efforts 
to foster transparent, 
accountable governance in the 
political and economic systems 
of the region." 
Indeed Paul Simmons grounded 
his testimony in the previous positions 
of other high ranking US state officials 
such as Larson and McManus, who 
These facts indicate 
that, from the point of 
view of Western 
governments, the 
primary motive for 
the E/Tllnitiative is 
to guarantee the 
security and stability 
of the nation states 
involved in oil 
supplies to the US 
and other advanced 
neo-liberal 
economies. 
had admitted that the US approaches 
"international energy policy 
recognising that imports supply 
roughly half of our (US) energy needs. 
Some of our trading partners are even 
more dependent on oil imports. The 
reality is that a disruption (in oil 
supplies) anywhere affects all market 
participants' (ERAction, 2004: 19). 
This reality of dependence on oil had 
become evident after the Middle East 
oil crisis in 1974, but it was only in 
2001, in a largely unipolar world, that 
the US government began to put 
together the framework for a new 
policy that would address that reality. 
The result in 2003 was the 
transparency compacts announced 
by the G8 countries in Evan, France 
for four Third World countries rich in 
oil and gas deposits. While the 
compacts stated their goal as that of 
'fighting corruption and improving 
transparency', the EITI subset of the 
compacts limited itself to the 
extractive, particularly, the oil 
industry. 
For this reason, the US provided 
the initial financial and technical 
support for installing the programme 
in Nigeria as elsewhere. These facts 
indicate that, from the point of view 
of Western governments, the primary 
motive for the EITI Initiative is to 
guarantee the security and stability 
of the nation states involved in oil 
supplies to the US and other 
advanced nee-liberal economies. In 
this regard, transparency simply 
comes to function as the outer layer 
of an onion of interests whose inner 
core or strategic objective is 
guaranteeing security and stability in 
oil supplies to the US and its western 
allies. It is for this reason that the 
issues of justice and development 
which lie at the core of oil extraction 
activities are ignored by the NEITI in 
favour of accounting norms. For these 
reasons too, it is no surprise as the 
recent UNDP report on the Niger 
Delta revealed, that the area should 
be characterised by mass poverty, 
worsening health statistics and social 
conflicts. 
This same analysis of an 
externally driven NEITI can be applied 
to other 'homegrown' economic 
management strategies such as the 
NEEDS. The Important issue in all 
these cases is that an institutional 
framework whose governing variables 
are provided by and serve the needs 
of external interests cannot meet the 
real development challenges of the 
Nigerian setting. While this has been 
the situation in Nigeria since the 
Babangida programme of reforms in 
1985, the presence of external 
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interests in the design and operation 
of our institutional framework has 
dramatically increased since 1999 
with the advent of the Obasanjo 
regime. 
The Practical Methods by 
which Institutional 
Arrangements are Given 
Effect 
It is today recognised that the 
activities of such institutions as the 
EFCC and ICPC are shrouded in 
controversy not because the goal of 
reducing corruption is controversial 
but because of the specific manner 
in which the institutions are 
conducting their operations. 
Accusations of bias against 
institutions indicate that the rules and 
regulations that the institutions were 
designed to promote are being 
selectively applied. Such 
accusations also indicate that the 
software of the institutions will not 
receive the support of members of 
society who perceive the framework 
as serving parochial rather than the 
common interest. To this extent 
areas of life that the framework seeks 
to legislate upon will be that much 
open to different interpretations and 
hence modes of conduct. Consider 
the following cases: 
• Chairman of ICPC, Justice 
Emmanuel Ayoola recently 
lamented the fact that 24 
governors against whom his 
Commission received allegations 
of corruption may go scot-free 
because the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria cannot investigate the 
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claims 'due to lack of funds.' 
In 2005 Code of Conduct Bureau 
(CCB) complained that it could 
not perform its statutory job 
because of certain constitutional 
constraints. Section 3(c) of the 
third schedule of the 1999 
constitution authorised the CCB 
to make public officers' asset 
declaration forms available for 
inspection by citizens on terms 
and conditions to be prescribed 
by the National Assembly 
(NASS). As at today, August 
2006, the NASS is yet to make 
any law to that effect. Thus 
members of the public who 
wanted access to the asset 
declaration form of Alhaji Audu, 
former Governor of Kogi State, 
who was accused of buying 
houses abroad while in office, 
could not do so. As the Punch 
Editorial of June 26, 2006: 16 
rightly asks, 'Of what use are 
asset forms that are hidden from 
the public?' 
In 2002, Vincent Eze, then Acting 
Auditor General of the Federation 
released an audit report that 
indicted all arms of government, 
ministers, agencies and 
parastatals of sloppy records and 
corrupt financial practices. 
Instead of commendations, Eze 
was openly reprimanded and 
retired prematurely. 
In 2005, Obasanjo aborted the 
reading of the first ever 
independent audit report on the 
oil and gas sector ordered by the 
NEITI. The audit revealed 
embarrassing financial 
irregularities in the oil sector. 
The constitution grants immunity 
to those categories of public 
office holders who are in the 
strongest position to steal public 
funds. 
The Contradictions between 
the Economic and the 
Political Institutions 
Every economic strategy is framed 
within the context of political 
interests. Therefore, institutional 
frameworks for resources 
management bear the bold imprint of 
existing cleavages in the political life 
of society. Indeed, as Ake (2001: 1-
6) has pointed out, both the failure of 
development and the failure to put 
development on the agenda in Africa 
are largely attributable to negative 
political conditions. In Nigeria, several 
negative political conditions 
undermine the effectiveness of all 
types of development and resource 
management institutions. These 
include the very character of the ruling 
class, the fragility of the Nigerian 
state, and the problem ofthe paradox 
of legitimacy of the state in general 
and of government in particular. These 
problems have meant that established 
institutional frameworks have been 
characterised from within by personal 
or group agendas, politics, partial and 
clouded visions, bitter conflicts and 
lack of commitment to their success. 
Corruption 
Corruption has been held to be the 
single most important cause of the 
failure of institutions and institutional 
frameworks for resources 
management in Nigeria. As Adedeji 
(2005:31) noted at the 11th Nigerian 
Economic Summit, "where corruption 
is prevalent in a country, it can be 
traced to the institutions because 
institutional capacity affects the 
overall setting for national 
development and when institutional 
capacity is high, it impacts positively 
on development". Thus, "if institutions 
are untainted by corruption, the rate 
of development would accelerate" 
(NESG, 2005: 31 ). 
Former US Ambassador to 
Nigeria, Lyman (2002) has observed 
that, "Nigeria reels from one of the 
worst economic declines in the world 
... corruption has robbed the country 
blind". Over the years Transparency 
International has also consistently 
ranked Nigeria among the top five 
most corrupt countries in the world. 
Over the period, Nigeria has earned 
huge incomes from the exploitation 
of its various resources. The fact that 
these incomes have not translated 
into human development and have 
instead produced poverty for the 
majority of Nigerians can be attributed 
to the phenomenon of corruption. For 
example, the allocations to the 
various levels of governance between 
1999 and 2005 totaled N11 trillion. 
Revenues accruing to the state from 
all sources for the same period are 
estimated to be over N20 trillion. 
Indeed, over the 1970 - 2005 periods, 
it is estimated that Nigeria earned 
over US $300 billion from oil revenues 
alone. However, these huge national 
resources have not led to 
development because of horrendous, 
large scale and pervasive corruption 
at the various levels of governance 
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institutions. 
In a recent interview in an edition 
of The Africa Report, the former 
Managing Directorofthe International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Mr. Raymond 
Baker, has also revealed that, "A 
realistic estimate of money stolen in 
Nigeria and deposited in foreign 
banks would be $50 to $100 billion. 
It is much more difficult to estimate 
how much was taken out through 
smuggling commodities and drugs. 
Over the last 30 years, Nigeria has 
probably been the biggest exporter 
of illegal capital out of Africa." 
To appreciate the impact of 
corruption upon institutional design 
and performance, there is need to 
understand the dynamic of corruption 
in Nigeria. In an earlier work (lyayi, 
1986; 1989), we have argued that the 
phenomenon of corruption represents 
the most important means adopted 
by an emergent ruling African political 
class for the primitive accumulation 
of capital. The logic of the primitive 
accumulation of capital is immanent 
in capitalist production relations; 
however, in the context of 
underdeveloped capitalist societies, 
it assumes a special character. This 
special character derives from the 
fact that in these societies during the 
colonial period, the coloniser 
exercised both political and economic 
power. The attainment of 
independence in these contexts 
occurs against a background in 
which the coloniser cedes formal 
political power to the colonised, while 
retaining absolute control over the 
economic means necessary for 
members ofthe emergent ruling class 
of the colonised to actualise 
themselves, not only as the ruling 
political class but also as the ruling 
economic class in the situation. 
Efforts by the emergent class 
of indigenous capitalists to redress 
the problem through productive 
activity fail because of the regime of 
standards established by the 
coloniser and which members of the 
emergent ruling class cannot meet. 
In the Nigerian situation, the methods 
adopted in the early period (1960-
1985) included Nigerianisation, 
indigenisation and 
commercialisation. From around 1985 
onwards, the methods came to 
include privatisation. All these 
methods failed, however, because 
they were premised on an initial 
practice and hence status, which 
required that members of the 
emergent ruling class have at their 
disposal the collateral needed to 
obtain loans to enable them to 
compete with outsiders for control 
over the most lucrative sectors of the 
economy. This problem, which we 
have described as that of the 
proletarianisation of the emergent 
ruling class (lyayi, 1983), 
increasingly alienated members of 
the emergent indigenous ruling 
political class from control of the 
economy. Increasingly, it became 
one whose resolution was seen as 
the defining process for the 
emergence of an indigenous ruling 
class in the true sense of the word in 
the Nigerian situation. 
To resolve this dilemma, the 
emergent ruling class increasingly 
turned to public office as the most 
important source 'for private 
enrichment'; in other words, to 
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corruption. Hence, over the period, 
corruption became and has remained 
the principal method for the primitive 
accumulation of capital in the 
Nigerian neo-colony. Since holding 
public office also became the most 
important and generous source of 
private enrichment, the contest for 
state power and hence occupation of 
public office became a matter of life 
and death for members of the 
emergent ruling class. The fractious 
nature of the ruling class occasioned 
by divisions along ethnic, religious 
and other lines merely added to the 
fierceness of the contest for state 
power. Under these circumstances, 
neither the institutions nor the values 
of governance could be established. 
This explanation for corruption 
and its significance in the 
development of the ruling class has 
obvious significance for 
understanding the ineffectiveness of 
any institutional framework for 
resources management in Nigeria. 
Granted the fact that state resources 
provide the most ready sources for 
the primitive accumulation of capital, 
and that control of the state provides 
access to state resources, 
institutional frameworks come to be 
designed to be formal expressions of 




A number of suggestions have been 
made about how to redesign 
institutions in order to promote 
democracy and development in 
Nigeria. The NEEDS document, for 
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'A strategy of 
development that 
focuses upon the 
economic and that 
does not address the 
murky waters in 
Nigerian politics 
cannot lead to 
development. It may 
speak about 
development but it 
would be one that 
was designed to fail. ' 
example, seeks to anchor Nigeria's 
development on four key strategies 
that include reforming government 
and institutions, growing the private 
sector, implementing a social charter 
and value re-orientation. However, the 
NEEDS document is seriously 
flawed because it takes as 
unproblematic the neo-liberal 
foundations on which it rests. The 
neo-liberal foundations are clear not 
only on the variables and values that 
must govern development but also on 
the role that individual countries must 
play within the global capitalist neo-
liberal economy. 
The document also takes as 
unproblematic the nature of Nigeria's 
ruling class. The key features and 
characteristics of members of the 
dominant coalition in particular and 
of the ruling class in general have 
been discussed elsewhere and 
include: lack of a sense of history; 
lack of creativity; laziness, 
dependence, hedonism and pleasure 
seeking, crudity, authoritarianism, 
opportunism, sadism and even 
masochism. An anti-institutional 
framework such as that embedded 
in neo-liberalism that provides 
veritable grounds for the flowering of 
these features cannot deliver on the 
promises that it makes for the simple 
reason that these values are the 
recipe for chaos in any society. A third 
and certainly not the last problem with 
the NEEDS framework is that it is 
totally disconnected from the politics 
of the economy. Development is an 
all-rounded process that includes the 
economic, the political and the social 
for the very reason that each of these 
takes off from and impacts upon the 
other. Paraphrasing what we have 
noted elsewhere (lyayi, 2005), 'A 
strategy of development that focuses 
upon the economic and that does not 
address the murky waters in Nigerian 
politics cannot lead to development. 
It may speak about development but 
it would be one that was designed to 
fail.' 
In reviewing the East Asian 
economic miracle, the World Bank 
in 1993 maintained that the miracle 
was made possible because there 
'was a de facto social compact made 
among the elites and between the 
elites and the people. First, leaders 
had to convince economic elites to 
support pro-growth policies. Then they 
had to persuade the elites to share 
the benefits of growth with the middle 
class and the poor, the leaders had 
to show them that they would indeed 
benefit from future growth' (Ake, 
2001: 156). This social compact was 
constructed on the canvass of a 
number of values to which the East 
Asian elites collectively subscribed. 
These included accountability, 
transparency, the rule of law and 
negotiated consensus. The new 
context of the social compact and the 
supporting value system constituted 
a radical departure from the old East 
Asian society. Something of a radical 
departure is also required in Nigeria 
today for the success of any 
institutional framework that seeks to 
promote development and democracy 
in Nigeria. 
We suggest that such a 
departure will have to be grounded 
upon the following elements and the 
important institutional transformations 
that they imply: 
The adoption of a people-centred 
approach to resources 
management and development; 
in effect the adoption of an 
approach to development that 
recognises that the goal of 
development is to 'create a 
global humane society based on 
human values and social welfare' 
(Kanyenze, G., Kondo, T. and 
Martens, J., 2005:3) and in which 
the people as owners and 
beneficiaries of the development 
process are the prime movers of 
the process; 
The redesign of the Nigerian state 
to play a key role in resources 
development and allocation; in 
effect a Nigerian state that is 
ethical, accountable, 
responsible, development-
oriented and genuinely 
committed to maintaining the 
independence and autonomy of 
the country against the designs, 
interests and interventions of 
imperialism and its institutions; 
The creation or emergence of a 
new political class whose defining 
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values and mindsets support 
both democracy and 
development in Nigeria; 
The creation or emergence of a 
private sector that is truly 
Nigerian, whose members are 
creative, disciplined and whose 
capital accumulation strategies 
and methods derive from 
productive investment and 
savings rather than from the 
massive looting of state funds; 
The creation of politics and 
political practices that are values-
driven and therefore truly 
competitive; that enable the 
separation between interest 
groups and their political 
platforms on the basis of their 
ideologies and programmes of 
transforming society; 
The criminalisation of corruption 
in the true sense of the word; 
The rejection of nee-liberalism 
and the recognition as well as 
acceptance of the fact that nee-
liberal 'capital-led globalisation 
is at the roots of the crisis in 
Africa, (and that) its alternative 
is not only necessary but now 
also timely, because capital-led 
globalisation is coming to the last 
few decades of the end of its 
history' (Kanyenze, G., Kondo, 
T. and Martens, J., 2005:2-3). 
The design of institutions on the 
basis of inclusiveness. 
Institutions cannot be designed 
in the absence of interests and 
politics; for this same reason, the 
stability of institutions requires 
that all interests must be 
represented or that these 
interests must be taken account 
of and accounted for in the 
design of institutions. 
Conclusions 
Institutional failure lies at the heart of 
the problems of development and 
democracy in Nigeria. The major 
factors responsible for the failure of 
institutions include faulty institutional 
design, weaknesses in the 
ideological framework within which 
institutional choices are made, 
external origins of the governing 
variables and values used in designing 
the institutions, the practical methods 
by which institutional arrangements 
are given effect, the contradictions 
between the economic and the 
political institutions, and corruption. 
To ensure an institutional 
environment that supports 
democracy and development, there 
is need to address these factors 
within a broader ideological framework 
that recognises and provides support 
for the idea that the state, rather than 
the private sector, must lead 
development efforts. Thus there is 
need to reject the neo-liberal ideology 
of development. In the end, all 
institutions are human creations and 
therefore cannot be insulated from the 
expression of these interests in both 
their design and practical operation. 
The major implication of this is to 
point not just to the relevance but 
more especially to the character of 
politics in shaping the design and 
performance of institutions. The 
challenge of this implication is that it 
suggests the need for a kind of 
politics in Nigeria that is constructed 
on the foundation of a social compact 
along the lines that made the East 
Asian 'miracle' possible. • 
*Dr Festus lyayi is of the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of 
Benin, Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria. 
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